Independence to Third Alternatives
Independence to Third Alternatives, or Independence to Irrelevant alternatives is a principle of Voting Theory.
- it says that if another alternative is added or removed, the position of a candidate should remain at least as good as it was
- this is an important principle in Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
- also in MCDA methods violation of this principle leads to Rank Reversal
Definition
- Suppose we have a set of alternatives (candidates) $A^*$
- Let us consider 4 different individual rankings over the sets $A^*$ and $A$ s.t. $A \subset A^*$
- (note that $A$ is a strict subset of $A^*$)
- The rankings are $R_1, R_2$ and $R'_1, R'_2$
- $S_1, S_2, S'_1, S'_2$ are indifference relations defined by these orderings (respectively)
- we assume that $R_1 \equiv R'_1$ and $R_2 \equiv R'_2$ for the set $A$
- that is, $\forall x,y \in A$:
- $x \ S_1 \ y \iff x \ S'_1 \ y$
- $x \ S_2 \ y \iff x \ S'_2 \ y$
Example:
- $A^* = \{x, y, z\}$
- $R_1: x > y > z, R'_1: z > y > z$
- $R_2: z > y > x, R'_2: y > x > z$
- now restrict ourselves to $A = \{x, y\} \subset A^*$
- $R_1 \equiv R'_1$ and $R_2 \equiv R'_2$
- the only thing that changes is the relative position of $z$ within the pairs of rankings
A voting method $H$ is independent to third alternatives if
- the global ordering produced by $H$ under the set $A$ is the same for both rankings such rankings:
- $H(R_1, R_2) |_A \equiv H(R'_1, R'_2) |_A$
In other words, ordering of the set $A^* - A$ is irrelevant to the choice over $A$
Example 1
- Consider two dishes: beef and lamb
- The choice between these two alternatives should not change when pork is also available
- pork is irrelevant alternative to the preference ordering of beef and lamb
Example 2
Suppose there exist two ways to subscribe to some newspaper:
- paper subscription $P$: 100 USD
- web version $W$: 60 USD
Note that for the publisher the web version costs nearly nothing
The publisher proposes the following:
- $P$: 100 USD, $W$: 60 USD, $P+W$ also 100 USD.
- in this case we see that no rational decision taker will ever take just $P$, but always $P+W$
Before the preposition the distribution of readers could be this:
- $P$ for 100 USD: 30%
- $W$ for 60 USD: 70%
After:
- $P$ for 100 USD: 0%
- $W$ for 60 USD: 30%
- $P+W$ for 100 USD: 70%
The part of readers switched $\Rightarrow$ More money
There are several ways in which a method may suffer from dependence to 3rd alternatives:
Risk of Manipulation
A method suffers from the Risk of Manipulation if the outcome of an election can be changed by
- adding a new candidate or
- deleting a candidate
This manipulation is also sometimes called control.
Manipulation:
- suppose somebody knows the individual rankings
- they may propose a new candidate that will take some votes
- this way influencing the final result
Methods that suffer from the manipulation:
Sources